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Originally Posted by -=TB=- HORROR sounds like any war the americans did and lost after ww2  |
I think you're confusing some concepts along with history. I realize this is flame bait of the rankest kind; and the thread will doubtless go to hell six seconds after I rain on what you probably intended as humor, the confusing passive-aggressive use of the smiley notwithstanding. But a point or two.
The literal context of my post, a segment of which you quoted, is that the "complainer" had been militarily defeated because of his inability to adapt to his opponents weapons and tactics. So for your statement to be valid there must have been:
a) multiple wars after WWII;
b) in which the US was
militarily defeated;
c) due to an inability to adapt its strategy and tactics to the circumstances of the war;
d) after which the US can be said to have complained that no one should have been permitted to find such ways to defeat it.
So, got some examples for your statement, "sounds like any war the Americans did and lost after WWII"? Because I don't see it.
The only war remotely objectively classifiable as a defeat for the US was Vietnam, and there can be little argument that it was lost by the change in the citizenry's commitment to continue it, not because of the
military's capability. Indeed, had the military been permitted by its political masters to pursue unequivocal military victory which resulted in cessation of organized, major hostilities, it would have been a relatively easy matter.
The mere investiture of Haiphong Harbor may have done the trick within a matter of weeks, even days. Regardless, the destruction of the hydroelectric dams which produced the electrical power of the country would have been a simple matter, and devastating to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). US forces could have put and maintained large troop concentrations into the DMZ (recognized only by the US and RVN anyway) and into DRVN proper within a matter of days, and the NVA couldn't have prevented it or expelled them. Very soon the NVA would have been essentially unsupportable in the field. Even had North Vietnam not immediately sued for peace, it could not have maintained or fielded a cohesive, effective force capable of meeting and defeating US units.
Understand, we're not talking about what was a good idea or bad idea. Nor are we concerned with problems facing a post-open-hostilities government. Merely the military capacity to impose a military defeat on another country.
As I see it, you can't demonstrate a single postwar US military defeat, much less overcome the other hurdles.
Or is all this a tempest in a teacup anyway?
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Oh, and I'll address this to Anlushac-11 and von Mudra about Tigers and doctrine. I've seen pre-1944 German tanker memoirs which speak of German armor units in Russia in battalion-size attacks (on prepared positions with dug-in/concealed PAKs and armor as well as infantry) being configured so that the Tiger company or companies took a central "protected" spot in the armored formation, with light (Pz-III?) and medium (Pz IV/Panther?) panzer companies on either flank.
Was this to shield the Tigers? Was this German panzer doctrine at any point? Was it rational to put the least-survivable tanks in the positions where they faced the most chance of destruction? Or did it just reflect the very high value German doctrine put on the Tigers?