Re: 17 pounder
 

Tigers and Shermans had break downs just as much as each other, the Tiger was just harder to repair.

Re: 17 pounder
 

A version of the 17lbr was used in North Africa. They were called Phesant guns. They were rushed by air to Tunisia after the Commonwealth encountered Tigers and were used against Axis tanks in the actions at Medinine in March 1943.

The intended carriage for the 17lbrs were not ready so the guns were mounted on modified 25lbr carriages.

They look sorta like this
http://www.missing-lynx.com/gallery/...pheasant-1.jpg

Due to their importance, The Tigers were often kept at operational readiness levels comparable to any German tank unit.

Many of the Tigers faults stem from the early models with the troublesome 600hp engine. The later models did require lots of maintenance but so did any other tank.

Re: 17 pounder
 

I think you're confusing some concepts along with history. I realize this is flame bait of the rankest kind; and the thread will doubtless go to hell six seconds after I rain on what you probably intended as humor, the confusing passive-aggressive use of the smiley notwithstanding. But a point or two.

The literal context of my post, a segment of which you quoted, is that the "complainer" had been militarily defeated because of his inability to adapt to his opponents weapons and tactics. So for your statement to be valid there must have been:
a) multiple wars after WWII;
b) in which the US was militarily defeated;
c) due to an inability to adapt its strategy and tactics to the circumstances of the war;
d) after which the US can be said to have complained that no one should have been permitted to find such ways to defeat it.

So, got some examples for your statement, "sounds like any war the Americans did and lost after WWII"? Because I don't see it.

The only war remotely objectively classifiable as a defeat for the US was Vietnam, and there can be little argument that it was lost by the change in the citizenry's commitment to continue it, not because of the military's capability. Indeed, had the military been permitted by its political masters to pursue unequivocal military victory which resulted in cessation of organized, major hostilities, it would have been a relatively easy matter.

The mere investiture of Haiphong Harbor may have done the trick within a matter of weeks, even days. Regardless, the destruction of the hydroelectric dams which produced the electrical power of the country would have been a simple matter, and devastating to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). US forces could have put and maintained large troop concentrations into the DMZ (recognized only by the US and RVN anyway) and into DRVN proper within a matter of days, and the NVA couldn't have prevented it or expelled them. Very soon the NVA would have been essentially unsupportable in the field. Even had North Vietnam not immediately sued for peace, it could not have maintained or fielded a cohesive, effective force capable of meeting and defeating US units.

Understand, we're not talking about what was a good idea or bad idea. Nor are we concerned with problems facing a post-open-hostilities government. Merely the military capacity to impose a military defeat on another country.

As I see it, you can't demonstrate a single postwar US military defeat, much less overcome the other hurdles.

Or is all this a tempest in a teacup anyway?


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Oh, and I'll address this to Anlushac-11 and von Mudra about Tigers and doctrine. I've seen pre-1944 German tanker memoirs which speak of German armor units in Russia in battalion-size attacks (on prepared positions with dug-in/concealed PAKs and armor as well as infantry) being configured so that the Tiger company or companies took a central "protected" spot in the armored formation, with light (Pz-III?) and medium (Pz IV/Panther?) panzer companies on either flank.

Was this to shield the Tigers? Was this German panzer doctrine at any point? Was it rational to put the least-survivable tanks in the positions where they faced the most chance of destruction? Or did it just reflect the very high value German doctrine put on the Tigers?

Re: 17 pounder
 

Or maybe it was made to lure Russian forces in the middle so the flanks would be weaker. Just a thought.

Re: 17 pounder
 

I dunno. I myself would have put the Tigers on the flanks, but what do i know?

Re: 17 pounder
 

Flanks need speed and flexibility for maneuvres, and center needs strenght and power...ABC

Re: 17 pounder
 

IIRC Soviet tactics were to launch a massive artillery strike followed by a rapid armored thrust. The Soviets often broke through the middle, sometimes with heavy casulties to split up a unit and destroy it piecemeal.

By putting Tigers in the middle they took brunt of the assault but were also the best equipped to deal with a assault. Also by putting the hardest hitting and longer ranged guns in center the Tigers could offer good fire support to either side equally as well. Also if units had to be moved to plug breakthroughs the center was the closest to either side.

Re: 17 pounder
 

Anlushac pretty much hit the nail on the head. From Tigers in the Mud, I learned exactly that and that Tigers were in the middle for I guess attacking and absorbing the attack.

Re: 17 pounder
 

Yep, and meanwhile, the lighter, faster Pz4s could use their flank positions to maneuverer around the enemy while they were busy dealing with the Tigers. Still, it continues to go to show you that no, Tigers weren't freelance hunters in the war, and neither were any other tanks. Only in the very final stages would german tanks hunt alone, and that was due to them being the only tank left more then them thinking they could handle things by themselves.

Re: 17 pounder
 

Well, that settles that. I suppose if I had been commanding, say, Schwere Abteilung 501 in 1943, and had put a company of Tigers on each flank, and a mixed company of Pz-IIILs & Pz-IIINs & Pz-IVHs in the middle, with two companies of mounted grenadiers just behind the IIIs and IVs - I would have wound up with nothing in the middle, and a 2000 m gap between two unescorted companies of Tigers. Because the T-34/76s and T-354/85s would have rolled right through my middle, laughing all the way. And now the unescorted and separated Tiger companies will find rank upon rank pf dug-in ZiS 2 PAKs, and after them the SU-152s lie in wait on the outside of each Tiger company, waiting their turn.....